As the commercialisation of space continues, the number of satellites and the volume of debris in space is increasing, and consequently, there is a growing need for better systems to ensure satellites are able to operate safely and avoid in-orbit collisions. Space situational awareness (SSA), the ability to identify objects and their position in space, and accurately predict their trajectory to know where they will be at a point in the near future, plays a critical part in this process. SSA information makes it possible to assess when there may be a close approach between a satellite and another object, so that necessary action can be taken such as one party manoeuvring to avoid contact. Yet, for this to work, space object information needs to be combined from various sources and operational data including ephemerides needs to be shared. If only it were that simple.
Challenges around SSA and military assets
There is currently no universally accepted framework for sharing data and tracking and managing space objects, so different nations and entities operate their own solutions. These various systems use different algorithms and models so don’t necessarily agree on potential close approaches. Alongside this highly fragmented landscape, there is also often reluctance to share data about space assets because of political and security concerns and commercial sensitivities.
Complicating things further is the fact that space is no longer insulated from conflict. Military satellites are not only operational assets but also strategic targets. They face threats from anti-satellite weapons, jamming, cyber-attacks, and more. In response, operational data about military assets is often kept classified meaning that some satellites’ locations and movements are hidden. While understandable, these tactics make it even harder for non-military actors to operate safely.
If these satellites are not listed in public catalogues, there is a risk that commercial satellites could come dangerously close to military satellites. The inability to see these satellites or communicate with their operators creates serious blind spots for commercial operators and other space users. Commercial operators may also unknowingly manoeuvre their satellites into a riskier position simply because they don’t know what’s nearby.
How can we balance space safety with national security priorities?
Some argue that more transparency is needed across the board. Others counter that revealing too much could compromise national security. The issue of sharing proprietary and sensitive data is a concern for many operators. Furthermore, some operators are restricted in terms of sharing data such as military and defence satellite operators. There also mistrust that the data will be used for purposes other than for flight safety purposes.
Still, there are ways to improve safety without compromising sensitive information. One option is to establish secure, one-way communication channels that allow commercial operators to send ephemeris and manoeuvre data to military entities. With this approach, military organisations don’t have to reveal their own positions or intentions, they just need to know where the commercial satellites are so their positions can take that into account when necessary. This kind of limited, structured exchange could prevent unnecessary close approaches without opening up classified data.
Another model is the pooled-data approach used by the Space Data Association. By aggregating orbital data rather than openly sharing it, participants retain control over their information while contributing to a more accurate and comprehensive picture of the orbital environment. This kind of system respects the need for confidentiality while supporting safety-of-flight services that benefit all parties. SDA offers an established, secure IT and legal infrastructure to prevent the misuse of member data and full legal options against any offender for violations and damages.
We employ an independent, trusted third party framework for data exchanges. Member raw data is provided to a trusted third party (SDC) and only the process results will be made available to the affected members (members not affected will not receive the alerts).
The SDA limits the sharing and provision of member data to other SDA members, except when expressly needed to fulfil the SDA’s service objectives.
Where do we go next?
Despite the urgency, no single government or agency seems eager to lead the charge. There’s been discussion of creating a global SSA architecture with distinct regional segments, but consensus on who should fund, manage, or initiate such a system remains elusive. Everyone sees the value, but no one wants to make the first move.
We are now in a phase where SSA is not just about avoiding collisions; it’s about navigating a new era of space use, and the current architecture is not equipped to deal with the complexities that this brings. Without new mechanisms for coordination, even limited ones, collision risks will rise, misunderstandings will multiply, and the fragile trust that underpins orbital safety will erode.
Space is a shared domain. Whether the mission is commercial, civil, or military, no operator functions in isolation. A more structured approach to SSA is not just desirable, it’s absolutely critical. We may never reach full transparency, but that doesn’t mean we can’t establish better system so that no operator is flying blind.
The Space Data Association (SDA) is an international, not-for-profit, non-government entity (NGE) that brings together public and private satellite operators to support the controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of data critical to the safety and integrity of the space environment. For more information, get in touch.